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Highlights 
 PTSD showed altered behavioral responses to potential monetary losses 
 When avoiding monetary losses, PTSD depicted increased activation of basal ganglia  
 When anticipating monetary gains, PTSD exhibited altered activation of basal ganglia 
 During receipt of monetary gains PTSD showed altered activation of basal ganglia 
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Abstract 
Background: Recent studies suggest that Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) might 
be associated with dysfunctional reward circuitry. However, further research is needed to 
understand the key role of the reward system in PTSD symptomatology.  
Methods: Twenty participants with PTSD and 21 Trauma-Exposed matched Controls 
(TECs) completed the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task during an MRI session. Reaction 
times (RTs) and hit rates were recorded. Brain activity was investigated during the 
anticipation and the outcome of monetary gains and losses.  
Results: During the anticipation of monetary loss, PTSD participants had higher RTs 
than TECs. However, the groups did not differ at the neurofunctional level. During successful 
avoidance of monetary loss, PTSD patients showed higher activation than TECs in the left 
caudate nucleus. During the anticipation of monetary gains, no differences in RTs were found 
between groups. PTSD patients had specific activations in the right amygdala, nucleus 
accumbens, putamen, and middle frontal gyrus (p < 0.05 family-wise error (FWE)-corrected), 
while TECs had specific activation in the anterior cingulate cortex. When obtaining monetary 
gains, PTSD patients had specific activation in the caudate nucleus, while TECs had specific 
activations in the right hypothalamus, subthalamic nucleus, and left inferior frontal gyrus. 
Conclusion: For the first time, functional brain activation during both the anticipation 
and the outcome of monetary rewards is reported altered in PTSD patients. These alterations 
might be associated with the complex symptomatology of PTSD. 
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Introduction 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating psychiatric disorder that can develop 
after experiencing a traumatic event (1). PTSD consists of different dimensions of symptoms: 
re-experiencing the traumatic event, avoidance/emotional numbing, and hyperarousal 
emotions so the exploration of the underlying mechanisms is considerably complex (1,2). 
PTSD has been conceptualized as heightened fear reactivity (3), but recent studies suggest 
that besides the well-described alterations of the brain fear circuitry (4–6), altered reward 
circuitry could also contribute to core components of the pathology, such as emotional 
numbing, characterized by a diminished interest in pleasant activities (7). Preclinical studies 
also suggested that chronic stress is responsible for striatal dopaminergic alterations, 
contributing to re-experiencing symptoms (8,9). Thus, altered reward circuitry might be 
associated with different dimensions of the symptoms. 
Two phases or periods can be distinguished in reward processing. The anticipation phase 
represents the period during which an individual is expecting the reward, and the 
consummatory phase represents the period during which an individual actually obtains the 
reward (10-12). In line with this distinction, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have highlighted 
distinct neural mechanisms underlying the anticipation and the consumption of monetary 
gains and losses (13,14). In healthy participants, anticipation of a reward has been found to 
activate foci in the ventral striatum including the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), while reward 
delivery recruits the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the dorsomedial part of the caudate 
nucleus, and the posterior cingulate cortex (14, 15).  
To date, only few behavioral studies have focused on reward mechanisms in PTSD. In a 
paradigm during which participants were instructed to rate the attractiveness of female faces, 
PTSD veterans spent less time viewing the stimuli than did male veterans without PTSD, 
which revealed their lack of motivation to pursue pleasant experiences (16). Self-reported 
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ratings of expectancy and satisfaction evaluated with a wheel-of-fortune gambling task were 
lower in PTSD veterans than trauma-exposed controls (TECs) (17). In line with this, in a 
decision-making task during which participants could maximize their total number of points 
(i.e., reward) by learning a particular response pattern, healthy control participants learned 
correct responses faster than did PTSD patients (18). In contrast, a study using a probabilistic 
classification task reported that male veterans with severe PTSD symptoms performed better 
than male veterans without PTSD symptoms in reward trials, with no difference in 
punishment trials (19).  
Only a few investigated the neural dysfunction of the reward system. Despite no 
differences observed during the expectation of reward, altered responses have been observed 
during the expectation of an aversive outcome (20). As compared with healthy controls, 
PTSD patients showed lower activation in key components of the reward system when 
obtaining rewards, namely the NAcc, the ventral and dorsal striatum and the mPFC (20,21). 
Understanding the neural mechanisms underlying the expectation and the outcome periods in 
PTSD patients and their association with the complex symptomatology may help clinical 
assessments of the effect of interventions.  
To date, studies have focused on a limited number of structures of the reward system, such 
as the NAcc and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and the implication of other brain structures has 
not been explored in PTSD. Hence, there is a need for whole-brain studies to investigate 
changes in the reward circuitry globally. Moreover, previous studies mainly compared gain 
and loss trials, which precluded the exploration of the effect of monetary gain and loss 
independently.  
The aim of the present study was to investigate the neurobiological mechanisms 
underlying the anticipation and the outcome of both monetary gain and loss in PTSD patients 
at the whole-brain level. We hypothesized that the reward brain circuitry would be differently 
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activated during both the anticipation and the outcome of monetary reward in individuals with 
PTSD as compared with TECs. 
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Methods and Materials  
Participants 
PTSD patients were recruited from the Psychiatry Pole of three different hospitals in 
the region of Marseille, France (Hôpital de la Conception, Hôpital d’Instruction des Armées 
de Sainte-Anne, Hôpital Laveran). TECs were recruited by advertisements/flyers distributed 
at the “Hôpital de la Conception” hospital. The structured Mini-Internal Neuropsychiatric 
Interview for DSM-IV (1) was administered by psychiatrists to assess PTSD diagnosis and to 
rule out any potential comorbidities. Demographic and clinical characteristics of participants 
are described in Table 1. Participants recruited at the “Hôpital d’Instruction des Armées de 
Sainte-Anne” and “Hôpital Laveran” hospitals were veterans, and those recruited at the 
“Hôpital de la Conception” hospital were civilians. In total, 22 PTSD patients met the DSM-
IV criteria for PTSD following one traumatic event (1). PTSD patients additionally completed 
the trauma-related scale, the PTSD Check List Scale (PCL-S) French version (22). Two 
patients were excluded from the data analysis due to excessive head motion during image 
acquisition. Subsequent analysis included 20 PTSD patients. Twenty-three TECs without a 
history of neurologic or psychiatric disorders were included. Two participants were excluded 
from the data analysis due to excessive head motion during image acquisition. Thus, the final 
sample included 21 TECs. These participants were exposed to one traumatic event 
(ascertained by self-report), without PTSD developing according to the DSM-IV criteria. The 
groups did not differ in age: t(39) = 1.10, p > 0.1, education: t(39) = -1.00, p > 0.1, or sex: 
χ2(2, 41) = 0.01, p > 0.1 (Table 1). 
Exclusion criteria for all participants included noncompliance with 3T fMRI safety 
standards, a history of head injury with loss of consciousness, signiﬁcant untreated medical 
illness, neurological disorders, pervasive developmental disorders, and pregnancy. Exclusion 
criteria for PTSD patients included a history of bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, and alcohol 
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or substance dependence not in sustained full remission within 6 months before the study. The 
study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants provided 
written informed consent in agreement with ethical approval from the committee South 
Mediterranean 2 (registration no.: 2013-A01016-39). 
 
Experimental paradigm  
The Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task developed by Knutson and colleagues 
(2008) was used (See Figure 1). The detailed task description is included in the Supplemental 
material.  
 
MRI acquisition 
 fMRI data were acquired as described in Supplemental material.  
Behavioral Data Analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed with SPSS (v18.0). Reaction times (RTs) and hit rates 
(HRs) were recorded for each participant. Only the correct trials for which participants 
responded within the 1-s time window were included. Because we intended to compare neural 
mechanisms during incentive versus non-incentive trials, we analyzed RT and HR differences 
between incentive and non-incentive cues. Therefore, we used repeated-measures ANOVA 
for each condition (positive and negative cues) with Group (PTSD and TEC) as the between-
subject factor and Incentive (10-0€ cents; 50-0€ cents; 200-0€ cents) as the within-subject 
factor for both RTs and HRs. Bonferroni correction was used for post-hoc comparisons. Main 
and interaction effects were analyzed separately for negative (i.e., predicting possible loss) 
and positive (i.e., predicting possible gain) cues. 
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fMRI data analyses  
 MRI data were analyzed by using SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 4 volumes from each session, corresponding to signal 
stabilization, were excluded from the analysis. We used standard preprocessing procedures, 
including motion correction, slice timing correction, EPI co-registration to the T1 image, 
normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, and smoothing with an 8-
mm full-width-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
Statistical analysis of fMRI data focused on the blood oxygen level-dependent 
response that occurred during the anticipation of monetary gain/loss and the outcome of 
monetary gain/loss, by using a mass-univariate approach based on General Linear Models 
(GLMs). For each participant, we computed a model with 12 regressors describing events of 
interest: anticipation of gain (i.e., +10, +50 and +200); anticipation of no gain (+0, still 
requiring a response); anticipation of loss (i.e., -10, -50 and -200); anticipation of no loss (-0, 
still requiring a response); hit gain (+10, +50, and +200); failed gain (+0); no gain, as 
announced (+0); avoided loss (-0); non-avoided loss (-10, -50 and -200); no loss as announced 
(-0); neutral (triangle); and button press. To investigate the linear relationship between brain 
activity and the magnitude of the incentive value, parametric regressors modulated the 
following conditions: anticipation of loss, anticipation of no loss, hit gain and non-avoided 
loss. These regressors of interest were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function.  
The 6 realignment parameters were included to correct for signal changes due to head 
movement. To control for scanner and physiological noise, additional regressors that depicted 
harmonic changes up to 1/128 Hz were added.  
Results from the single-subject level for our contrasts of interest were fed into a 
flexible factorial design as implemented in SPM, including the Subject and Incentive values 
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(±0 versus ±10 ±50 ±200) as within-subjects factors and the Group (PTSD and TEC) as a 
between-subjects factor. The comparisons were as follows: anticipation of gain versus 
anticipation of no gain; anticipation of loss versus anticipation of no loss; outcome of hit gain 
versus outcome of failed gain, and outcome of avoided loss versus outcome of loss. 
Common group effects were assessed by using conjunction analyses, showing 
significant activation increase in both PTSD patients and TECs (23). Given the exploratory 
purpose of this research and the within-subject nature of this study, we used an exclusive 
masking procedure to compare maps of brain activity between groups. The exclusive masking 
procedure allows for detecting differences between groups in spatial patterns of significantly 
activated voxels. With masking, any significant area of change in one group is excluded from 
the analysis of the other group, leaving only changes exclusive to this other group in the 
statistical assessment. This statistical technique has been described in functional 
neuroimaging studies (24–29). A threshold of p < 0.05 uncorrected was used for the SPM 
maps used for the exclusive masking. The more liberal the exclusive mask threshold, the more 
conservative the masking procedure. The resulting statistical maps were then corrected for 
multiple comparisons with a p < 0.05 Family-Wise Error (FWE) cluster-extent threshold (30) 
across the whole brain. 
For the PTSD group only, the extracted parameter estimates for each significant 
cluster and the PCL-S scale scores and subscores were investigated using Pearson correlation 
with Bonferroni correction. The PCL-S scale can be divided into 3 subscores, corresponding 
to 3 main symptoms of the disorder: reexperiencing (item 1-5), avoidance/numbing (items 6-
12) and hyperarousal (items 13-17). These correlation analyses explored the relationship 
between brain changes activity and PTSD core symptoms. 
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Results 
As expected, for the PTSD patients, PCL-S total scale scores were higher than the cut-
off of 44 points (MPCL-S total score = 61.90, SD = 12.33) (22). Behavioral results are described in 
Table 2. Mean RTs, total gain, the rating of feeling of motivation and the rating of feeling of 
fear of losing money did not differ significantly between the PTSD and TEC groups. 
During the anticipation of monetary losses, Group had a main effect on RTs 
(F1,39 = 5.42; p < 0.05), with TECs responding faster during target presentation than PTSD 
patients (See Figure 2A). We found neither a main effect of Incentive (F2,78 = 2.02, p = 0.14) 
or Group by Incentive interaction (F2,78 = 0.06, p = 0.94) on RTs during the anticipation of 
monetary losses, but found a main effect of Incentive on HRs (F2,78 = 12.08, p < 0.001) (See 
Figure 2C); thus, both groups had better performance when anticipating higher potential 
monetary losses. We found no main effect of Group (F1,39 = 1.86, p = 0.18) during the 
anticipation of monetary losses. 
During the anticipation of monetary gains, we found no main effect of Group 
(F1,39 = 0.00, p = 1.00) or Incentive (F2,78 = 2.60, p = 0.08) and no Group by Incentive 
interaction on RTs (F2,78 = 1.61, p = 0.21) (See Figure 2B), but found a main effect of 
Incentive on HRs (F2,78 = 5.47; p < 0.001) (See Figure 2D), demonstrating better performance 
when anticipating higher monetary rewards. We found no main effect of Group on HRs 
(F1,39 = 0.01; p = 0.95) during the anticipation of monetary rewards. 
 
fMRI Results 
During the anticipation of gain versus no gain, both PTSD patients and TECs showed 
activation in key structures of the reward circuitry including the head of the caudate nucleus, 
left insula, inferior frontal gyrus, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (31–33) (Table 
3). PTSD patients but not TECs exhibited significant activation in a cluster including the right 
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NAcc, putamen, and amygdala (see Figure 3A, Table 3). Parameter estimates extracted from 
each structure within this cluster are depicted in Figure S1 of the Supplemental material. 
Moreover, PTSD patients but not TECs showed significant activation in the right superior 
frontal gyrus (SFG; BA 6) (see Figure 3B, Table 3). Conversely, TECs but not PTSD patients 
showed activation in the bilateral ACC (BA 24, BA 33) (see Figure 3C, Table 3). We found 
no group differences during the anticipation of loss versus anticipation of no loss. For PTSD 
patients, Pearson correlation coefficients were not significant between extracted parameter 
estimates and PCL-S scale scores and subscores (all ps > 0.1).  
During the outcome of hit versus failed gain, both PTSD patients and TECs activated a 
network of brain region involved in the receipt of reward, including precentral gyrus, 
precuneus, superior parietal lobule, middle frontal gyrus and subcallosal gyrus (Table 4) (34). 
PTSD participants showed a unique significant activation in the body of the caudate nucleus 
bilaterally (see Figure 4A, Table 4). However, TECs but not PTSD patients showed a 
significant activation in a region including the right hypothalamus and the right subthalamic 
nucleus (See Figure 4B). Parameter estimates extracted for each structure of this cluster are 
depicted in the Figure S2 of the Supplemental material. In addition, TECs but not PTSD 
patients activated a cluster in the left IFG (BA 46, BA 10) (See Figure 4C, Table 4). 
Finally, during the outcome of avoided loss versus loss, PTSD patients but not TECs 
showed activation in the body of the left caudate nucleus (Figure 5; Table 5).  
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Discussion 
The present findings identify differences between PTSD patients and matched TECs in 
behavior and neural activation in the reward circuitry during both the anticipation and the 
outcome of monetary rewards. During the anticipation of monetary losses, PTSD patients 
were slower than TECs to respond during target presentation, but the groups did not differ at 
the neural level. PTSD patients showed higher functional activation in the left caudate nucleus 
when they successfully avoided monetary losses. In contrast, during the anticipation of 
monetary rewards, PTSD patients showed higher activation in the putamen, NAcc, amygdala, 
and SFG, despite no difference in behavioral performance. However, PTSD patients did not 
show activation in the ACC during the anticipation of monetary rewards. Moreover, when 
they finally obtained money, PTSD patients showed a unique significant activation in the 
caudate nucleus but failed to reproduce the TEC activations in the subthalamic nucleus, 
hypothalamus and left IFG. 
Our behavioral results for monetary losses are in agreement with the literature 
describing PTSD patients having slower behavioral responses toward negative stimuli (35–
37). This behavioral pattern has been associated with an attentional bias of PTSD patients 
toward trauma cues (38-40), which suggests that their behavioral responses to potential 
monetary losses might relate to some attentional disengagement difficulties from threatening 
stimuli. This hypothesis fits with the cognitive theory positing that emotional distress and 
maintenance of anxiety disorder is due to the existence of non-adaptative attentional biases 
toward information with adverse value (41). However, when participants expected to lose 
money, the two groups did not differ at the neural level. 
Despite no differences in behavioral responses between the groups during the expectation 
of monetary gains, we found specific activation patterns in PTSD patients. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study describing specific activation in cortico-striatal circuitry and limbic 
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circuitry, including the putamen, NAcc, amygdala, and SFG, during the anticipation of 
monetary rewards in PSTD patients. Our results differ from studies that previously reported 
NAcc hypoactivation in PTSD patients when receiving monetary rewards (18,42). NAcc is 
known to code for expected positive incentive magnitude (15,20), so PTSD patients might 
show high NAcc activation when anticipating but not when receiving rewards.  
Our result of higher amygdala activation in PTSD patients during the anticipation of 
monetary reward was surprising because exaggerated amygdala activity in PTSD patients has 
repeatedly been found in paradigms provoking PTSD symptoms (42, 43) but also in response 
to stimuli provoking the anticipation of anxiety (44), in fear conditioning and extinction 
paradigms (45-47) or during the processing of faces displaying negative emotion. 
Nevertheless, the finding of amygdala activation fits well with studies of healthy individuals 
showing an amygdala response to positive, rewarding stimuli, as well as during appetitive 
conditioning (48-54). One study showed amygdala reactivity to happy versus neutral faces in 
a masked facial affect paradigm in patients with anxiety disorders (PTSD, panic disorder and 
social phobia) (55), which suggests that the amygdala may be involved in processing 
emotional salience in general, rather than the negative valence (56–59). In this respect, 
increased amygdala activity may be associated with increased emotional significance of 
patients expecting money. This situation might reflect a maladaptive strategy of PTSD 
patients to cope with a stressful situation while trying to achieve goals (60). Moreover, ACC 
activation was found in TECs but not PTSD patients, which reinforces our interpretation of 
patients having altered strategies to cope with stressful situations. Indeed, the ACC has long 
been thought to play a critical role in emotional processing (61), and its hypoactivation is 
known to be associated with disrupted fear mechanisms (4,5,62). Thus, in line with animal 
(63) and human studies (64–66), alterations in the fear circuitry could parallel those observed 
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in the reward circuitry, which would contribute to PTSD patients unreasonably anticipating 
the negative consequences of an action. 
The putamen, part of the dorsal striatum, is known to be activated during the anticipation 
of a reward (15, 67), particularly when participants are presented with potential rewards such 
as the opportunity to obtain money (68, 69). Specific putamen activation in PTSD might be 
associated with the opportunity to obtain money. Finally, we found increased activation in the 
SFG in PTSD patients during the anticipation of monetary rewards. The SFG projects to the 
dorsal striatum and is involved in motor/sensorimotor function and integration (70,71). Given 
the key role of this structure in the integration of sensorimotor, cognitive, and motivational 
information, PTSD patients may have recruited motor resources to a greater degree to 
successfully achieve the task. Given the absence of significant differences in behavioral 
performances between the groups when attempting to get money, increased activity in those 
motor structures could reflect enhanced efforts from PTSD patients to obtain equivalent 
behavioral responses.  
When receiving monetary rewards, we found a specific activation in the left caudate 
nucleus of PTSD patients. The caudate nucleus is part of the dorsal striatum, known to 
mediate affective properties of outcomes in rewarding conditions (32,35-37). It is particularly 
important for predicting and evaluating actions based on information about their outcome, 
consistent with its role in goal-directed behavior (38-40). This structure has been found 
activated by tasks entailing both a perceived connection between the action and outcome and 
an uncertainty about whether the action will lead to the desired outcome (41). O’Doherty and 
colleagues (2004) postulated that dopamine projections to the dorsal striatum might be 
involved in the modulation of stimulus-response or stimulus-response-reward associations. 
Thus, when PTSD patients finally received money, the increased activation in the caudate 
nucleus could result from the cognitive effort developed during the anticipatory period. This 
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interpretation also fits with the finding of increased activation in patients’ left caudate nucleus 
during successful avoidance of monetary losses. When they obtained money, TECs but not 
PTSD patients showed activation in the right hypothalamus, STN, and left IFG. The 
hypothalamus is involved in primary motivational processes that can be related to hedonic 
responses (72). The STN is known to respond to reward delivery (73,74), but its inactivation 
can lead to reduced affective responses for positive and negative stimuli (75). A possible 
explanation for this finding is that structures having a key role in hedonic processes may be 
less active in PTSD patients when receiving the reward. Reduced activation in these areas 
could reflect altered processing in the evaluation of hedonic information, which might be 
related to emotional numbing in PTSD. Moreover, reduced activity in the IFG, a brain region 
having a key role in cognitive and emotional processing (76) and more specifically in 
emotional regulation (77,78) could also contribute to emotional numbing.  
In summary, PTSD may feature altered brain activity associated with reward mechanisms 
during both the anticipation and the outcome of reward. On the one hand, these alterations 
could be described as the association of attentional bias to threatening stimuli together with 
exaggerated activity of structures involved in goal-directed behaviors during their avoidance. 
On the other, they could be associated with exaggerated recruitment of structures having a key 
role in cognitive processes during the anticipation and the outcome of reward, 
counterbalanced by hypoactivation of structures involved in hedonic and emotional regulation 
processes.  
The present study provides promising results with a few limitations. It includes a sample 
with high heterogeneous trauma type, including civilians and veterans with PTSD, and 
controls exposed to civilian trauma. Veterans with PTSD experience different symptoms than 
do civilians with PTSD (79). The nature of the traumatic event may affect our results, but the 
size and heterogeneity of our population prevent the exploration of this question. We 
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encourage future studies to explore the impact of trauma type on brain functioning in PTSD. 
Although the comorbidity profiles of PTSD patients in this study are similar to those reported 
in most neuroimaging studies, and patients were on stable medical treatment, the 
pharmacological caveat needs to be mentioned. Indeed, previous studies showed that 
pharmacological treatment has an effect on brain structure and function in PTSD patients 
(80). Moreover, clinical data support the impact of serotoninergic and other medication 
changes on reward brain mechanisms (81). In the current study, the main effects and between-
group differences remained after excluding PTSD patients on medication from the analysis. 
Future research controlling for medication status might be warranted. Finally, the lack of 
significant correlations between clinical scale scores and functional brain activity differences 
precludes the investigation of a causal relation between them.  
By describing altered activation of structures involved in fear and reward circuits in 
PTSD, this study contributes to a better knowledge of the neural mechanisms involved in this 
psychiatric condition, suggesting new perspectives for the development of therapeutic 
strategies. Because fear and reward mechanisms are intrinsically linked, therapeutic strategies 
should benefit addressing symptoms on both fronts. A primary goal of cognitive behavioral 
therapy is to improve hedonic capacity (82), so changes in reward-related brain activity in 
response to cognitive behavioral therapy in PTSD should be further explored.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) Task Structure  
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Figure 2. Behavioral responses of participants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean and Standard Error of reaction time differences and hit rate differences; A. Reaction time differences (ms) 
for negative cues. B. Reaction times differences for positive cues. C. Hit rates differences (%) for negative cues. 
D. Hit rates differences (%) for positive cues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-200.00-(-0.00) -50.00-(-0.00) -10.00-(-0.00)
H
it
 r
a
te
s
 (
%
)
-10
0
10
20
30
+200-(+0.00) +50.00-(+0.00) +10.00-(+0.00)
H
it
 r
a
te
s
 (
%
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
-200.00-(-0.00) -50.00-(-0.00) -10.00-(-0.00)
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
s
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
s
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
TEC
PTSD
+200.00-(+0.00) +50.00-(+0.00) +10.00-(+0.00)
R
e
a
c
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 d
if
fe
re
n
c
e
s
-30
-20
-10
0
A B 
C D 
         
31 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Anticipation period - brain response to gain versus no gain  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-B (left): Increased responses to the anticipation of gain versus no gain in PTSD exclusively masked by 
trauma-exposed controls (TEC); C (left): Increased responses to the anticipation of gain versus no gain in TEC 
exclusively masked by PTSD; mask threshold p < 0.05. A: Region including the right amygdala, the right 
putamen, the right caudate nucleus (head); Parameter estimates extracted from the peak of the cluster depicted in 
A illustrate a selective activation for anticipation of gain in PTSD but not in TEC; B. Right superior frontal gyrus 
C. Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) (BA 24, 33); A-B (right): Parameter estimates extracted from the peak of 
the cluster illustrate a selective activation for the anticipation of gain in PTSD but not in TEC; C: Parameter 
estimates extracted from the peak of the cluster illustrate a selective activation for the anticipation of gain in 
TEC but not in PTSD. 
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Figure 4. Outcome period - brain response to monetary gain vs. no-gain      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brain response to monetary gain versus no gain A: PTSD exclusively masked by trauma-exposed controls 
(TEC); B-C: TEC exclusively masked by PTSD; mask threshold p < 0.05. A. Cluster including the bilateral 
body of the caudate nucleus; B: Cluster including the right Hypothalamus, and subthalamic nucleus C: Cluster 
including the left inferior frontal gyrus; Parameter estimates extracted from the peak of the cluster illustrate 
activation for the outcome of successful positively cued trials compared to failed cued trials in the PTSD group 
but not in the TEC group (A right) and in the TEC group but not in the PTSD group (B,C right).  
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Figure 5. Outcome period - brain response to avoided loss vs. loss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Brain responses to avoided loss versus loss in PTSD exclusively masked by trauma-exposed controls (TEC); 
threshold p < 0.001 and mask threshold p < 0.05. B. Parameter estimates extracted from the peak of the left 
caudate (body) illustrate a selective activation for avoided loss in PTSD but not in PTSD.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of participants  
Characteristics of participants: Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) for age, education, duration since trauma 
exposure.  
 
 PTSD 
n=20 
TEC 
n=21 
Statistics  
Sex 7 F, 13 M 8 F, 13 M  χ
2
 (2, 41)=0.01, p>0.1 
Age, years (SD) 39.30 (13.39) 34.76 (10.83) t(39)=1.10, p>0.1 
Education, years (SD) 7.80 (3.04) 8.86 (2.83) t(39)=-1.00, p>0.1 
Main Trauma Type    
Natural disaster (earthquake)  1 0 -  
Vehicular accidents 4 5 - 
Physical assaults 4 3 - 
Sexual assaults 0 3 - 
Hold-up 4 0 - 
Combat exposure 7 1 - 
Unexpected death  0 9 - 
Duration since trauma, months (SD) 55.45 (73.00) 97.32 (91.08) t(39)=-1.62, p=0.11 
Comorbidity    
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) 11 0 - 
MDD + General Anxiety Disorder  1 0 - 
Medication    
Antidepressant 1 0 - 
Anxiolytic  3 0 - 
Antidepressant + psychoactive 
medication  
6 0 - 
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Table 2. Behavioral characteristics of participants 
 PTSD 
n=20 
TEC 
n=21 
p-value 
Behavioral data    
Mean RT (msec)  230.45 (22.00) 222.05 (19.82) 0.21 
Mean RT positive cues (msec)  219.28 (35.17)  217.60 (26.48) 0.86 
Mean RT negative cues (msec)   223.66 (27.08) 224.65 (33.37) 0.92 
Total gain  10.94 (12.99) 7.35 (19.67) 0.49 
Rating of feeling of Motivation 7.73 (2.75) 6.69 (2.25) 0.19 
Rating of feeling of fear to lose Money 4.25 (3.78) 3.64 (3.02) 0.57 
Behavioral characteristics of participants: Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) for the presentation of target, the 
total gain, rating of feeling of motivation, rating of feeling of fear to lose money  
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Table 3. Anticipation period - brain response to gain versus no gain 
 
Stereotactic coordinates correspond to standard MNI brain. Reported regions survived a threshold level of p 
<0.05 FWE-corrected. Mask threshold for group comparisons was set at a conservative level of p <0.05. L=left; 
R= right; MNI= Montreal Neurological Institute; BA = Brodmann area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions L/R MNI 
Coordinates 
BA k Z score 
PTSD and TEC (conjunction)        
Caudate head  R  9 12 -3 -  317 4.71 
Brain stem  L  -6 -15 -
12 
-  151 4.49 
Insula left  L  -42 15 -9 -  149 4.34 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus  R  48 3 27 9 285     4.29 
Precuneus L  -21 -69 48 7 66 4.19 
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex R  3 36 27 32 330 4.03 
PTSD exclusively masked by 
TEC 
       
Putamen/ NAcc/amygdala  R 18 6 -3 - 69 4.28 
Superior frontal gyrus  R 18 3 63 6/8 59 4.27 
TEC exclusively masked by 
PTSD  
       
Ventral anterior cingulate cortex L/R 0 9 27 24/33 99 4.49 
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Table 4. Outcome period - brain response to hit gain vs. failed gain 
 
Stereotactic coordinates correspond to standard MNI brain. Reported regions survived a threshold level of p < 
0.05 FWE-corrected cluster. Mask threshold for group comparisons was set at a conservative level of p < 0.05. 
L=left; R= right; MNI= Montreal Neurological Institute; BA = Brodmann area  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions  L/R MNI Coordinates BA k Z score 
PTSD and TEC controls 
(conjunction) 
       
Precentral gyrus L  -42 6 30 - 90 5.50 
Precuneus L  -27 -72 42 - 450 5.25 
Superior parietal lobule R  30 -69 48 - 275 4.93 
Middle frontal gyrus  R 30 9 60 - 88 4.74 
Subcallosal Gyrus L  -15 9 -12 - 209 4.31 
PTSD exclusively masked by 
TEC 
       
Caudate nucleus  R 18 18 3 - 220 4.60 
TEC exclusively masked by 
PTSD  
       
Hypothalamus/STN/ R 6  -6 -9 - 42 3.99 
Inferior frontal gyrus  L -42 42 6 10/46 60 3.97 
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Table 5. Outcome period - brain response to avoided loss compared to non-avoided loss 
 
Stereotactic coordinates correspond to standard MNI brain. Reported regions survived a threshold 
level of p <0.05 FWE-corrected. Mask threshold for group comparisons was set at a conservative level 
of p <0.05. L=left; R=right; MNI=Montreal Neurological Institute; BA=Brodmann Area 
 
Regions  L/R MNI Coordinates BA k Z score 
PTSD exclusively masked by TEC        
Caudate nucleus (body)  L -27 21 21 - 65 4.18 
         
